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I. Introduction
It is generally understood that when a consumer purchases a product
he/she has actually chosen the product for certain attributes or character-
istics contained in the product. For instance the attributes contained in
a typical food product might be taste, energy, nutrients or convenience of
preparation. This approach was first introduced by Lancaster (1966). A
problem arises in this regard if the consumer does not have complete know-
ledge of or access to data regarding all the attributes contained in any
product. When such a situation exists it leads to the likelihood that the
consumer’s expenditure decisions may not be optimal and that budget misallo-
cation will occur.
In particular the concern over the quality of Americans’ diet and
consumers’ lack of knowledge about food products led in 1969 to the White
House Conference on Food Nutrition and Health (Final Report, 1970). One
result of this Conference was a call for some standardized system to provide
nutritional and other information to consumers. As a result rules were
promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1972 and approved
in 1973 (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, (USHEW), 19731)
requiring the now familiar standardized nutritional label for all packaged
food products which either are nutritionally fortified or which make nutritional
claims. In addition the regulation provides that any nutritional data
voluntarily provided to be in the FDA format. Beloin (1973) provides a
summary and explanation of the regulations.2
Since the first nutritional labels began appearing in 1973 there has
been a good deal of study concerning the benefits and effectiveness of the
existing regulations and the possibility of their expansion or alteration.
Statutory authority in the area of food labeling is split among three federal
agencies. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has jurisdic-
tion over meat and poultry products with the FDA controlling all other foods.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is involved in food labeling through its
responsibility for regulation of food advertising. An FTC proposal in 1974
(presently unadopted) would have mandated that television commercials for
foods required to have nutritional labeling on packaging contain nutritional
and caloric information or make a statement as to the lack of such nutri-
tional value (Bettman, 1975).
The FDA on the other hand seems to be taking a wait and see attitude
regarding the effectiveness of present regulations before proposing exten-
sions or alterations. Among the possibilities currently being considered
by FDA are alterations in the format in which the data is presented (USHEW,
19781). Suggested changes include elimination of numbers from the label and
replacing them with graphs or wedge charts or adjectives such as good, fair
or poor. Also FDA is considering expansion of regulations to require dis-
closure of data about certain specific substances in food which consumers
may want to avoid for various reasons. In this regard FDA intends to pro-
pose that sodium and potassium content be declared on all nutritional labels.
In an attempt to ascertain the effectiveness of existing regulations and to
determine consumers perceptions of possible changes FDA, FTC and USDA jointly
held public hearings on the issue of food labeling at five locations in
the U.S. from August 22 to October 29, 1978 (USHEW, 19781, 19782).3
Studies and research on the effects of label disclosures have not been
able to discern any particular tangible benefits accruing to consumers from
the regulations. Consequently advocates of label disclosure have been forced
to rely on criteria such as the consumer’s “right to know” to justify their
call for disclosure regulations (Daly, 1976; USHEW, 19782).
An interesting dichotomy seems to have been uncovered in studies con-
cerning consumers’ use of nutritional data. It appears when asked, a large
percentage of consumers will say they want nutritional data, they will use
such data and they would be willing to pay something extra to have such data.
However, studies pertaining to actual usage of nutritional data tend to show
that consumers often don’t understand the data in the format presented and
seldom make use of it.
In particular a survey by Lenahan, et al.,(1972) indicated nearly 100%
favored nutritional labeling, 60% would use such data and 44% would be willing
to pay more on their food bill for it. A similar national survey of 1500
persons by FDA (USHEW, 19732) produced similar results. Seventy-five percent
said they would use nutritional labeling and almost half were willing to pay
50c more per week on their food bill to have such labeling. Ironically a
repeat survey by FDA (USHEW, 1975) after the requirements had been in effect
for awhile indicated a somewhat less favorable outlook towards labeling.
Fifty-eight percent of respondents reported to have noticed nutritional
labeling on food products and from this group 57% had used the data (this
group comprises 33% of the entire sample). Only 40% were now willing to pay
an extra 50C a
A survey
were concerned
week for the data.
of New York state households by Daly (1976) indicated 91%
about nutrition and 58% were willing to pay something extra4
on their food bill for it. A national survey of women conducted by the
Gallup organization for Redbook (1976) reported 91% were concerned about
nutrition, 76% were interested in having more information about nutrition,
66% had read nutritional labels “during the last several months” and 49%
were willing to pay an extra 3$ per food item to have nutritional data be
placed on all foods. A study by Liechtenstein(1974) reported 71% would use
the label data and 54% were willing to pay something extra on their grocery
bill to have it. Another national survey by the Economic Research Service
(ERS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA, 1977) reported 54% found





followup phase of the survey conducted about a year after the first phase.
The results of these and other surveys in the area are quite similar.
indicate, as mentioned earlier, that a large majority of consumers
nutritional data and have a desire to use the data. Generally about
indicate some willingness to pay extra to obtain the data. The problem
is that studies report that actual usage of the data by consumers is minimal,
and consumers often have difficulty understanding the data in its present
format.
Lenahan, et al.(1972) reported that only 15% of respondents understood
the labels and only 10% used them. As noted earlier FDA (USHEW, 1975) reported
one-third of consumers had used the data. The Redbook survey (1976) reported
58% found information about nutrition confusing. Similar results were reported
by Jacoby, et al (1977). They found that consumers did not utilize much of
the available data especially when brand names were available. They also
found that acquisition decreased as the number of items shopped for increased.
During long shopping trips data acquisition was estimated to be less than 10%.5
The authors concluded that the majority of consumers neither use nor compre-
hend nutritional data in making food purchase decisions.
In a test of the FTC proposal to require presentation of nutritional
data on television commercials Scammon (1977) compared two peanut butter
spreads (Skippy and Koogle), and nutritional data were fabricated to make
Koogle appear more nutritious than Skippy. The data were presented in the
proposed FTC format. The results showed that in
contrary a large majority of respondents thought
In fact those presented with the fabricated data
that than the control group.
spite of advertising to the
Skippy was more nutritious.
were more apt to conclude
When respondents in the second FDA survey (USHEW, 1975) were asked if
they understood label components, most claimed they did. For instance some
reported levels of understanding are as follows: calorie 82%, RDA 64%,
protein (grams) 62%, fat 58%, cholesterol content 51% and sodium content
36%. However, direct questioning regarding nutritional knowledge often did
not bear out the claims.
Particularly distressing to supporters of nutritional disclosure is
the fact that low income groups, those with lesser education and the elderly
(those most in need of dietary improvement) are least likely to understand,
acquire and use nutritional data. Daly (1976) reported that difficulty in
understanding or utilizing data was much more acute among the poor, aged and
uneducated. Chi square tests to measure differences in response to questions
concerning ability to process and use information were significant at .05 or
less for groupings based on age, income and education. The FDA (USHEW, 1975)
reported only 25% of those over 50 had used nutritional labels, and use was
only 242 for those with low socioeconomic status. These groups also expressed6
much less willingness to pay extra for such data. The ERS report (USDA,
1977) indicates similar findings in this area also. Conversely the Redbook
survey (1976) indicated only minor variations in response based upon age.
Some evidence does seem to indicate that consumers are becoming more
aware of nutrition and labeling in recent years. Better Homes and Gardens
(1978) found 78.5% within a panel of its readers had read label information
in the last ten days.
past several months.
Summaries of the
Redbook (1976) reported 66% had read labels during the
literature on labeling have been provided by General
Mills (1978) and Babcock, et al.(1975). Costs to industry for providing
labeling have been reported by Albrecht (1978), General Foods (1975) and the
Wall Street Journal (1973). Rusoff (1978) summarizes the industry viewpoint
on labeling. Summaries of the Government’s outlook towards labeling have
been provided by FDA (USHEW, 19782) and Forbes (1978).
The understanding of factors in consumer information processing is
important in determining why consumers often fail to utilize the information
resources at their disposal. The well supported principle of concreteness
says that consumers tend only to use
in the stimulus and will use it only
Information that has to be stored in
information that is explicitly displayed
in the form in which it is displayed.
memory, infered from stimulus or trans-
formed tends to be ignored. From this Bettman and Kakkar (1977) have con-
cluded that policy to make data available to consumers is not sufficient.
The data must be presented in a form which is readily processable.
A study by Stanley (1977) tends to verify this proposition. In the
study consumers were presented with nutritional data on cereals and then
immediately after were asked to rank the cereals on perception of nutritional7
content and preference. The result was a correlation =
nutritional ranking of the cereals and consumer choice.
obtained for amount of variance in preference explained
ception. Quite obviously this was a case where data was
easily processable format and where it didn’t have to be
Bettman and Kakkar (1977) also note that consumers
t
,678 between the





information through either of two basic strategies. Choice may be made by
processing brands of a product whereby one brand at a time is chosen and
information is gathered on several attributes, then another brand is examined,
and so on. The other strategy is processing by attribute where a particular
product attribute is examined for several brands, and then another attribute
is examined, and so on. Studies have shown that consumers will process data
in the fashion easiest given the display. Since most displays emphasize
brands, processing by that strategy is encouraged and processing of attributes
such as nutritional value is naturally decreased.
In this regard Assam and Bucklin (1973) performed a latin squares
analysis of variance experiment to test consumers preference of different
label types. They found that manufacturer’s promotional statements on the
label were just as effective at influencing consumer’s purchasing decisions
as positive nutritional data. Similar conclusions were reached by Berning
and Jacoby (1974) who found that manufacturer determined data including price,
advertising and packaging are key factors in generating interest and awareness.
Other factors become important only at later stages. One could conclude from
this that tailoring displays to emphasize nutritional attributes would en-
courage processing by that attribute.8
In a summary article of the work on consumer use of information aids
Monroe Friedman (1977) concluded that overload of information and lack of
public understanding of the data provided were the basic problems causing
consumer failure to effectively utilize data at their disposal.
II. An Economic Theory on the Effect of Labeling on Food Products
A. Determination of losses from imperfect information
The situation reviewed in the preceding pages is basically a problem
dealing with the nature of consumers’ demand for and usage of information,
i.e., why do consumers on the surface want more data on food labels and then
when it is provided apparently fail to make use of it. To explain this and
other problems pertaining to product information acquisition, this portion. of
the paper will develop a theoretical framework within which the benefits and
costs of providing information to consumers can be analyzed. Due to the
great variety of products on the market, attempts to develop a theory suf-
ficiently general to encompass all or most products would be a difficult and
questionable undertaking. I will restrict the framework of this analysis
to food products and potential information disclosures concerning them.
Before proceeding it is necessary to distinguish between information
and data. Information can be defined as data which increases the knowledge
of the recipient. Data is therefore potential information. Before it becomes
information it must be processed by the recipient. The concern of this paper
is with data and information about particular food products. The data in
this case is produced either voluntarily or through regulation by the food
processor. But information is produced by the consumer through a household9
production function of the type developed by Becker (1973) with the inputs
being new data, prior information stored in memory and time. The mere
existence of data on a food label will do nothing unless the consumer pro-
cesses it into information. Since the type of data being dealt with here
is either mandated by regulation, or if voluntarily provided, subject to
regulatory guidelines; it is assumed for purposes of this paper that all
the data provided is accurate and not misleading.
Start with a consumer’s demand curve for some food product which can
be called product ‘A’. This demand curve at any time is largely determined
by the consumer’s perception of the attributes contained by the product
(Lancaster, 1966), This evaluation is made based upon the knowledge and
information available to the consumer at the time. Some of the attributes
of the product are readily discernible simply by trying the product, for
instance the way a product tastes can be quite accurately determined in this
fashion. Knowledge about other attributes such as nutritional content cannot
be easily determined in this manner. Therefore in a state of imperfect
knowledge and incomplete information the consumer’s existing demand curve
for ‘A’ may be different from what it would be in a state of perfect infor–
mation.
Let D1 be the consumer’s initial demand curve for ‘A’ based upon
his/her subjective evaluation of the attributes of ‘A’ in period t. Now
define DT as the consumer’s true demand curve for ‘A’ based upon perfect
information. If D1 # DT, the result will be a misallocation of consumer
expenditureswith corresponding changes in consumer’s surplus and losses
in welfare.10
To formulate this loss assume in the absence of perfect information
that the following three possibilities exist with some probability of
occurance attached to each:
(1) The consumer
attributes contained in
curve which would occur
(2) The consumer
attributes contained in
has overevaluated the true quantity and nature of
the product and D1 > DT(1) ‘here ‘T(1) is the demand
with perfect information if this situation holds.
has underevaluated the true quantity and nature of
the product and D1 < DT(2)’ ‘here ‘T(2) ‘s ‘he
demand curve which would occur with perfect information if this situation
occurs.
(3) The consumer has correctly evaluated the attributes of the pro-
duct and the current demand curve, in this case Dl, is equal to the demand
curve, DT, which would occur with perfect information.
Only one of these situations can actually exist at any time so the
probabilities of their occurrence sum to one. Letting Xl, X2, X3 stand
respectively for the probabilities of (l), (2) and (3) occurring it can
be said that
X1+X2+X3=1.
‘ote ‘hat ‘*lY ‘ne ‘f ‘T(l)’ ‘T(2) ‘r ‘1 = ‘T actually ‘Xist at any ‘ime
as the demand curve which would be attained with perfect information.
The consumer incurs a loss in terms of welfare if either situation












Using the above figure and assuming a constant market price for ‘A’, P+<,
the loss if (1) or (2) occurs can be formulated (Peltzman, 1973). If (1)
occurs it becomes clear that the consumer has purchased too much of ‘A’.
He/she has purchased Al units in period t but actually should have purchased
only A2 units. For the additional units, A2 Al, beyond A2 which the consumer
purchased he/she paid an amount equal to A2 EF Al, but the actual value of
these units to him/her as now revealed by DT(l) is only A2EGA1. Therefore
the consumer has incurred a welfare loss in period t on these units of A2EFA1
- A2EGAl = GEF. If (2) occurs then the consumer has purchased too little
of ‘A’ and she/he should have purchased A3 rather than Al units.
The consumer’s surplus in period t would have been P*MJ had he/she purchased
A3 units, but since only Al units were purchased the surplus on the remaining
‘nits’ ‘lA3’ ‘s 10st” This surplus loss is represented by the area FHJ.12
Multiplying the loss to the consumer if (1) or (2) occur by the probability
of their occurrence (Xi) enables one to formulate an




‘L(E) = xl [1/2(EF)(FG)]+ X2 [1/2(IiF)(FJ)].







the expected loss can be formulated as follows:
(E2) ‘2 1 ‘1 1
‘L(t) = Xl [J f (P) dp+ ((A1-A2) P~’)- ~ f (p) dpl
o 0
‘3 2
+X2 [_f f (P) dp -~1 f2(P) dp - ((A3-A1) P*)].
o 0
Lquation 2 shows thatthe consumercan expectto incursome dollarloss from
misallocation of expenditures on good ‘A’. The consumer, therefore, has
incentives to obtain information which would reduce this EL, and shefhe
should be willing to pay for data (potential information) an amount equal
to the reduction in EL which would be obtained with more information. A
consumer demand curve for additional information about product ‘A’ can
thus be formulated based upon this willingness to pay. Let B1P (Figure 11)
be the consumer’s demand curve for additional information (I) about ‘A’.
The point where the demand curve intersects the horizontal axis, lP, is




obtain perfect information about ‘A’. To see this, note that any new infor-
mation the consumer obtains about ‘A’ can be expected to reduce EL from mis-
allocation. The larger the level of information obtained the smaller becomes
EL and the less becomes the willingness to pay for additional information.
It follows directly that the consumer’s willingness to pay for the last bit
of data that will give “perfect” information goes to zero since the loss
from misallocation has also gone towards zero. At this point 8QA/31A = 0.
Further information will not affect the level of ‘A’ purchased.
Now formulate the demand curve for information about ‘A’ as follows:
&/
‘I = f(QlA)--
where PI = the price of information or willingness to pay for information
Q1A = quantity of information about ‘A’.
— .— — —.—.-—
*/ — This formulation is chosen because quantity of information is usually
provided exogenously by regulation. The quantity provided thus determines
willingness to pay.14
The demand curve BI is based on the consumer’s willingness to pay for
P
information to reduce EL. In particular since EL = O with perfect information
it must be true that
(E3) = jp f(QIA) dQIA.
‘L(t) ~,
The expected loss is equal to the area under the information demand curve.
This means that the demand for information will be greater for those products
which have a greater EL.
Given the information demand curve, BIP, assume now that through govern-
ment regulation or voluntary producer initiative some quantity of nutritional
data is provided exogenously on the label of ‘A’.
Assume the consumer obtains 011 in additional potentially useful infor-






In period t the consumer purchases some finite quantity, Al, of ‘A’, where
‘1 ~ 0“ E4 gives his/her willingness to pay for the 011 in potential infor-
mation which now appears on each package of ‘A’. The consumer would then
be willing to pay this
potential information.
amount extra for a package of ‘A’ containing the
But he/she would be willing to pay this extra amount
only one time since repeated encounters with the data would provide no new
potential i.nformation. If the consumer perceives the label disclosure on the
Aith purchase of ‘A’ in period t, he/she would then be willing to pay a price
for this unit equal to
A.
11 fl f“(t’)dp -tf f(QIA) dQIA.
A o i-115
Graphically, this could be interpreted as a break in the consumer’s demand
curve at whatever unit he/she encounters the new data. It would be expected
that consumers of ‘A’ would encounter the new data at various points along
their individual demand curves during the period t. Also since consumers
may have previously acquired and processed elements of the new label data
through other means, the amount of potential new information will vary for
each consumer in that data with which a consumer is already familiar cannot
be expected to further decrease his/her EL. Further note that willingness to
pay for each unit of potential information is unique to each consumer since
it is determined by EL which will certainly vary from consumer to consumer.
Considering the total market demand, obtained by summing each individual
demand, it would follow that this curve would temporarily shift out during
any market period in which a labeling scheme had been instituted. This shift
would be a reflection of consumers’ additional willingness to pay for a pacli-
age containing the new data. As a practical matter this should be a very
transitory situation which will exist only in the period of initial exposure
to the new data and prior to evaluation of it. Once consumers evaluate the
data a new market demand curve will exist as a consequence of changes due to
evaluation in individual consumer’s demand.
The consumer’s willingness to pay for 011 in potential information is
represented by E4. The demand for information is determined by EL, and the
consumer is willing to pay a price for this data equal to the reduction in EL
that will be generated by the data. By subtracting E4 from the formulation
for EL, E2, one obtains a new EL, EL’, which will exist after evaluation of
the new information. Therefore,16
I?2- E4 = EL’
To
the data
determine how information reduces EL assume that upon processing
the consumer decides one of three things:
(1) He/she has been
(2) He/she has been
(3) He/she has been
overevaluating the product and D1 > DT.
underevaluating the product and Dl < DT.
correctly evaluating the product and D
1
= DT.
Suppose the consumer decides D1 ~ > D , a new demand curve, call it D , is o
formed where Do < D1. As long as 011 < 01 the consumer still has incom-
P
plete information. This missing information, 01 – 011, if obtained could
P
reveal to the consumer that he/she is still overevaluating the product and
‘O > ‘T’ or that he/she is now underevaluating the product and Do < DT or
that he/she is correctly evaluating the product and Do = DT. If the con-
sumer decides D > D 1 ~, he/she will reduce purchases in the present period
to some level A4 on Figure III where A2 ~ A4 < Al (A2 could be O if DT(1)
was such that the consumer would not purchase any ‘A’ at P*).
Figure III
‘A17
It has been shown that the consumer may still be overevaluating or
underevaluating the product after processing 011 in information if 011 < 01 .
P
As such the consumer will incur losses if either circumstance occurs. The
immediate concern is with the change in the area of potential loss due to the
reevaluation. By referring to Figure III it can be shown that since the con-
sumer is now operating on Do and purchasing less ‘A’ than before> the IOSS
from overevaluation (the loss if D
T(1) ‘s
curve) is less than before. This loss is
‘owever’ ‘he 10ss ‘f ‘T(2) ‘s ‘he ‘erfect
the perfect information demand
now expressed by the area REV.
information demand curve, the loss
from further underevaluation, expressed by the area RSJ, becomes larger. By
letting L stand for the total area of loss the change in the total area of
loss can be expressed as follows:
A
(E5)
‘1 1 ‘4 1 AL = fl f2(P) dP + j- f (P) dP - [2P’~(A1-A4) + J f (P) dP
o 0 0
‘4 2 +f f (P) dP].
o
As a result of reevaluation there will be some increase in the area of loss
in the event of underevaluation (RSHF from Figure III and some decrease in
the area of loss in the event of overevaluation (VRFG from Figure III).
These changes tend to offset each other. But depending upon the position-
ing of the particular demand curves the offset is not likely to be complete,
and there may be some increase or decrease in the total area of loss. There-
fore, the sign of 8L/31 is uncertain.
It should be noted that it is consistent within the present analysis
that situation (3) on page 2 (that D1 = DT) could still hold true. If this
were the case the consumer would now be underevaluating the product due to18
Lhc added informationsince D < D The loss i.s obtained in a straight
o 1“
forward manner by setting D1 = DT(2), which is, of course, consistent with
the analysis. It can be seen that E5 still holds true in this circumstance.
It has been shown that the change in the total area of loss from re-
evaluation due to new information is uncertain. However, it has also been
shown that if information is to be demanded and utilized by consumers, it
must be true that 21EL/~1< 0, that is, information must reduce the expected
loss. According to the development above, increased information does not
necessarily reduce the area of loss. It must be, then, that it reduces the
probability of these losses occurring. Recall from pagelO that X3 is the
probability that the consumer’s current demand curve is equal to DT. DO is
now the current demand curve, and Do
is based upon more information than D
1
was. It must be true then that the probability that DO is correct is greater
than the probability that existed for D~ being correct before the additional
information was obtained. In other words X3 has increased due to added infor-
mation. Since Xl + X2 + X3 = 1, it must be that Xl andlor X have decreased, 2
and therefore that EL has decreased. X3 can be expressed as follows:
= f(I)
‘3
where I is the quantity of information obtained about the product.
These results imply that additional information need not result in
better purchasing decisions by consumers. In fact it could result in worse
decisions. This type of phenomenon has been observed by Jacoby (1977). But
since EL has decreased one would expect on average better decisions to follow
from increased information.19
11 upon evaluating the information the consumer decides (2) or (3)
from page 16, the same basic results would follow. If she/he decides (2)
(that he/she has been underevaluating the product) it will lead to an in-
crease in demand to some D > D
o 1“ And if the consumer decides (3), D1 = DT,
there will be no change in demand for the product since he/she still believes
D1 is correct, and since this opinion is now based upon more information the
probability is greater now that he/she is right. EL will therefore decrease.




incur a cost in
is a one to one
that is, 011 in
of information
two types of costs involved in information provision.
a cost in providing the data on the label and consumers
processing the data into useful information. I assume there
potential conversion ratio between data and information,
data can through processing be converted into 011 in informa-
tion by the consumer. Remember that since data is defined as potential
information the amount of data that exists on any label is subjective and
unique to each consumer. The cost to producers for providing data apparently
includes some fixed component plus some variable component which is a function
of output. General Foods (1975), the Wall Street Journal (1973) and Albrecht —
(1978) discuss the costs incurred by industry in labeling. The fixed com-
ponent of cost arises due to expenses incurred in initially obtaining the
data and in preparing the label. The variable component occurs due to the
need for inspections
tions from the label
production costs are
and monitoring the production process to ensure no devia-
specifications. Also it is often argued that per unit
higher due to input rigidity imposed by labeling. In20
other words manufacturers are unable to alter their ingredient mix in
r(,sl)(]l)s~} L() l~ri{:~s sigll:lls iI clt)ill~; SC) would change tllc’ lab(’1 specil-ic~l-
tions. As such the cost to producers for providing label data for any food
product can be written as:
c = ~ + (3QA (cost for product ‘A’)
P
where Cp = the cost to producers for providing label data
a = fixed cost of providing label data
8 = per unit cost of providing label data.
The cost to consumers is an implicit cost of time. The more data a
consumer wishes to process into information the greater will be the cost in
time. The cost to consumers for processing data into information can be
written as follows:
c = YT c
where cc = the cost to consumers for processing information
Y = a measure of the opportunity cost of time
T = time required to process data into information.
T can be formulated as follows:
T=~O ‘I
where A = time required to process a unit of information
Q1 = quantity of information processed.
Lambda (A) can be interpreted as a function of education and prior nutritional
knowledge. The higher one’s level of education the more quickly and easily21
information can be processed and the lower will be A. Lambda is also a
function of the degree of clarity and conciseness with which the data is
presented. The clearer and more potentially understandable the data is,
the lower will be A. Over information or information congestion can be
interpreted as increasing A. By substituting for T one can obtain
cc = YOQ1).
2. The benefits of information
The benefit to consumers from processing information is the reduction
in expected loss (EL) from expenditure misallocation. The more information
a consumer processes the less will be EL. Since EL determines the demand
for information, PI = f(Q1,4),the demand for further information decreases.
The change in the demand for information with respect to quantity of in-






The value attained by E6 measures the marginal benefit to the consumer for
processing information considering the present time period t only.
the value in E6 is negative the absolute value of the expression is
Since
taken
“Information (I) does not appear as an argument i.nequation E2,
also DT(I) and DT(2) are not observable. So although it would be desirable
to express MB directly in terms of the change in E2 it is not possible to
do SO. Therefore it must be expressed in terms of E3 as is done in E6, E6’.22
to obtain the marginal benefit in period t, MBt, to the i
th consumer from
processing information about ‘A’ in that period.
(E6’) MBti = la(.ff(QIA) dQIA)/aQIA\
Assuming these benefits are obtained independentlyby consumers, the total
benefit in period t to consumers is obtained by the summation of the in-
dividual MBti over all consumers of the product.
N
(E7) Total MBt = Z i=l MBti
where N is the total number of consumers of the product.
Since it has been shown that willingness to pay for specific types of
product data measures expected reduction in EL from that data, an empirical
specification of the marginal benefit expression is obtainable by asking
consumers how much they would be willing to pay for some additional specific
information disclosure. Responses
reduction in EL or as the marginal
). iletermin(ation of information
would serve as a proxy for the expected
benefit of obtaining the information.
demand and provision
The benefits to producers from supplying label data depend upon how
consumers evaluate the information provided. If, upon processing the label
data, consumers decide they have been overevaluating the product, they will
reduce their demand for the product and the producer will incur sales losses
as well as higher costs due to labeling. The producer will derive some
positive benefit from providing label data only if evaluation of the data
leads consumers to increase demand for the product. One would expect,
therefore, that producers would not voluntarily provide additional label23
data on food products unless they perceived that evaluation of the data
by consumers would lead to an increased demand for the product thus en-
abling them to charge a higher price or sell a larger quantity. It could
also be noted that studies by Daly (1976) and the FDA (1975) have indicated
certain indirect effects on consumer behavior from label disclosure, These
effects, such as increased consumer confidence, could alter the demand curve
for affected products.
The optimum level of information for consumers to process on any




to the marginal cost of processing. It has been shown that
benefit curve decreases as additional information is obtained.
cost function as formulated is constant. Considering the present
time period t only, the optimum level of information to process on product A
from the ith consumer’s viewpoint occurs where
(E8) MBti = 3CC /aQIA =y~=Mc
i i
th
where MC is the marginal.cost of processing for the i consumer and which i
can be interpreted through “YAas being equivalent to the wage rate multiplied
by theunit processing time,
Since it is likely that any reductions in loss from information process-
ing would be permanent, it becomes necessary to measure these benefits into
future time periods by employing present value considerations to obtain a
more accurate representation of the true benefits of processing information.
This can be expressed as follows:24
M
(1:9) PVM13i= Z —:B~–
j=t (l+r)j
where PVMBi = the discounted benefit stream over the life of the ith
consumer.
j = time periods t, 2, 3 ..... M
M = remaining life span of the consumer from period t
r = an appropriate discount rate.
The total discounted benefit to all consumers of the product, total PVMB,
then becomes
N
(E9’) Total PVMB = Z PVMBi .
i=l
This derivation is analogous to that indicated by Nelson (1971) in his dis-
cussion of information search.
c. Analysis of consumer’s response to nutrition information
A brief summary of the theoretical framework is in order. It was
shown that in the absence of perfect information about a product the con-
sumer incurs some expected dollar loss (EL) from expenditure misallocation.
It was then demonstrated how this EL leads to a demand for information by
consumers who would rationally be willing to pay for information an amount
equal to the reduction in EL that would be generated. Finally it was shown
that both producers and consumers incur costs in providing data and informa–
tion respectively. These costs place limitations on the amount of data
voluntarily provided and the amount of information processed.
By appealing to the model it is possible to explain much of the material
outlined earlier in the review section of this paper which indicated a high2.5
desire by consumers for information but little actual processing or usage
of such information. In terms of the model the high desire for nutritional
and other information is an expression of the demand curve for information,
BI The low actual usage of the data provided is explained when one con-
P“
siders the costs consumers incur in processing the data into information.
Another research result outlined earlier, that certain segments of the popula-
tion (those with low incomes, poor education and the elderly) report a lower
than average usage of information, can also be explained in terms of the
model. It would be expected that on average members of these groups would
incur much higher costs of processing information in terms of A (time required
to process) than other consumers, although this may be offset somewhat by a
lower y (opportunity cost of time). In extreme cases A would be very large
for those who were not literate in English, visually handicapped or un-
familiar with nutrition and nutritional jargon. Figure IV below illustrates
this situation. A consumer with a marginal cost of processing information
of MC2 would not process any information if BI was his/her information demand
P
curve. If the costs were lower, say MCI, the consumer would process and use
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In terms of policy any programs designed to increase consumers’
nutritional literacy or to present the label data in a more easily process-
ible format will lead to consumers processing more information which will
reduce EL, a socially desirable result. A preliminary summary on the joint
hearings conducted by FDA, FTC and USDA reports senior citizens, “individuals
of low comprehension”, non-English speaking people and children were very
much in favor of proposals to present the label data in graphics form
(USHEW, 1978). In terms of the model this can be seen quite simply as an
appeal by these people to lower the cost of processing information. Another
conclusion from the hearings was that those with special dietary needs were
most willing to incur extra costs to obtain information. This would be ex-
pected since these individuals would have a higher EL and consequently a
higher demand for information.
III. An Application of the Model
A. Background
The model and theory developed in this paper are meant to be generally
applicable to all types of information and data pertaining to food products.
The type of data most frequently discussed thus far is nutritional data, but
unfortunately at the present time the author is not aware of any nutritional
data that would enable a direct application of the model. A type of product
information that can be analyzed, however, is weight information. Some foods,
specifically meats and poultry, tend to accumulate moisture in the packing
process, If the weight of this moisture is included in the weight of the
product appearing on the package label, the label weight will tend to over-
state the true amount of product contained in the package.27
Proposed federal regulations (USDA,19791_) will require that on average
the drained weight of the
essentially the amount of
weight. However, for any
product (the product minus accumulated moisture-–
pure product) be equal to or greater
particular package, depending on the
moisture accumulation, the label weight may be greater or less
weight. Most states allow a “dry tare” approach to be used in






the weight of the packaging material (the dry tare) from the weight of the
total package, and this results in the moisture being included in the label
weight. A few states (California,Washington, and Michigan in particular)
require that the label weight be based on the drained weight of the product.
In any case the actual drained weight of the product in a package may be more
or less than the weight specified on the label. Thus the consumer of any
given package may receive more or less a pure product than he/she had anticipated
based on the labeled weight. This is a problem of imperfect information quite
suited to analysis within the model developed previously.
The data to be analyzed consist of 406 packages of chicken sampled by
USDA researchers at retail outlets across the nation. Researchers obtained
the label weight for each package, then drained the moisture from each one
and reweighed it enabling them to measure the amount of moisture accumulation
in each package. The data were collected by USDA (19792)inseveral states
including some states which require drained weight labeling and some which
allow dry tare labeling. With this data it is possible to obtain an estima-
tion of loss due to imperfect weight information and derive a rough representa-
tion of the benefit to consumers from improved weight information.28
B. Empirical framework
For each of the 406 packages of chicken we have labeled weight (WL),
drained weight (WD) and price per labeled lb. (P~~). From each package using
P’~and WL a point in Euclidean
be obtained. This is shown as
two space somewhere on the demand surface can














To apply the model to this data it is necessary to be able to estimate
the triangular areas of consumer loss GEF and FHJ as illustrated on Figure V
and developed earlier in Figure I. No information exists about the demand
functions of individual consumers purchasing chicken. However, assuming the
packages of chicken sampled are representative of packages of chicken sold,
a demand curve going through some point such as F can be assumed to exist as
indicated on Figure V. The demand elasticities used in this study are the
national market price elasticities of consumer demand for chicken estimated
by Brandow (1961) and George and KinS (1971),29
In outlining the empirical framework assume for convenience that the
consumer has perfect information about the nature of all the product’s attri-
butes except weight. In the case where WD > WL, given the above assumption,
the consumer will be underevaluating the product (possibility2, page 10)
since there is more of the product, and hence more of the product’s attributes,
contained in the package than the consumer has been led to believe from the
information available–-namely the labeled weight. The loss to the consumer
from this underevaluation is FHJ. To estimate FHJ, HF and FJ must be found.
The procedure used to find HF is as follows:
1.0 WD - WL = WS, where WS is in this case the surplus amount of product
the consumer receives over and above the amount specified on the label. When
WD < WL, WS is the amount by which the product is deficient.
The consumer should be willing to pay some amount for WS. Assume he/she
is just willing to pay P~~for an amount up to WL“ Therefore, the consumer is
willing to pay less than P’”for amounts greater than W~ since the demand
curve is downward sloping. Employing this concept it is possible to arrive
at a formulation to measure the consumer’s additional willingness to pay ~~
labeled pound. This then is HF. ———
a more detailed exposition of the
p9<w w~
1.1 HF= ~fi (2 -~w—)
L L
FJ is found as follows:
The reader should consult the appendix for
steps taken in arriving at HF
where Ec = the elasticity coefficient
from the assumed demand
relationship (see p. 28).
2.0 piiw
L = purchase price/pkg.
p$,~~
2.1 -—-~= effective pricellb,
‘D30
p$<w
2.2 +- P~~= effective change in price/lb.
D
When WT # Wn the label price per lb. and the actual
L, u
lb. are not the same. The result is an effective
WD > WL the result is an effective price decrease
or effective price per
price change. When
as indicated in step 2.2.
A price change will always lead to a change in quantity demanded (Q) for any
product whose demand elasticity coefficient is other than O. FJ is the addi-
tional amount of product the consumer would purchase given the effective price
decrease. Solving for the change in Q will yield FJ. This is done by employ-
ing the elasticity formula, Ec = AQ P
AP Q’ making the appropriate substitutions
WL
(AP = P$’(w—- 1), P = P$’,Q = WL) and solving for AQ. When simplified the
D
following expression is obtained (the steps in arriving at FJ are also de-
lineated in more detail in the appendix):
w
2.3 FJ = AQ = EcWL(~L - 1).
D
To estimate the area of FHJ the triangle area formula is employed to
obtain:
3.0 LFHJ = l/2HF(FJ) where LFHJ = the loss from underevaluation.
The opposite case a consumer can encounter is where WD t WL. Here
the consumer will be overevaluating the product (possibility1, p. 10). Based
on the labeled weight she/he will think the product contains more than it
actually does. The loss from overevaluation is GEF (Figure V). The method
employed to estimate this loss is completely analogous to the technique
outlined for estimating FH.Jand hence is not delineated here. Let it suffice
to say that had the consumer known the weight deficiency, he/she would have
been willing to pay less per labeled pound for the product enabling FG to31
be obtained. Also the weight deficiency results in an effective price
increase which would lead to a decrease in Q enabling one to obtain EF. The
loss from overevaluation is therefore:
3.1 ‘GEF = l/2EF(FG) where LGEF = the loss from overevaluation.
c. Empirical results
In this instance the equation to estimate a loss from overevaluation,
‘GEF‘ is the same as that used to estimate a loss from underevaluation, LI?HJ ‘
so a single equation can be employed to estimate the losses from imperfect
weight information. The equation obtained through combining and simplifying
the expressions outlined in 1.1 and 2.3 is
4.0
‘s L = ~_ (EL.
WD - 1) (2EC - ;).
L
See the appendix for the algebra involved in the simplification.
Six runs of the analysis were made. The results are summarized in
Table 1. Results were obtained for the entire sample using (a) Brandow’s
elasticity estimate (Ec = -1.16) and (b) George and King’s estimate
(Ec = -.78). Results were also obtained by dividing the sample into two
parts, data from states which have drained weight labeling regulations and
data from those states which do not have such regulations. These subsamples
were each analyzed separately using both elasticity estimates. Two observa-
tions from the drained weight states subsample appeared to be outliers.
Both observations exhibited W. > Wn by a substantial amount due either to
L u
mislabeling or sampling error--although there
If these cases resulted from mislabeling they
losses and would be valid, although extremely
was no evidence of such error.
represent legitimate consumer








































(2) (3) (4) (5)
Numbers Numbers Loss to Total ex-
of cases of cases Consumers penditure




198 203 $0.3872 $1058.21



























–The observation in columns 2 and 3 may not total the sample size (column 1)
since in a few cases W =W L D“
2/
‘-Influential cases dropped.33
the error was made in the sampling process the cases are, of course, invalid.
Since their exact cause is uncertain the results of the analysis for the
drained weight states with these cases omitted are also included in Table 1.
The first three columns of the table are self explanatory. Column 4
(loss to consumers) is the result obtained from applying equation 4.0 to
each observation and summin~ over all the included observations. Column 5
(total expenditure) is simply the amount consumers would have had to pay at
retail for the sum of the observations included in the particular run. And
Column 6 (loss as a proportion of expenditure) is obtained by dividing the
loss from each run by the total expenditure (column 5) for that run.
D. Interpretation of results
Caution needs to be exercised in interpreting the results of the appli–
cation due to the small size of the data set and some rather strong assumptions
necessary to fit this particular data set to the model. At first glance the
actual losses to consumers seem quite small, but when one considers the total
amount spent on chicken in particular and other meats and poultry in general,
these types of losses can be significant. For instance per capita chicken
consumption in the U.S. in 1978 was 47.7 lbs., the average price was $0.66/lb.
meaning that on average U.S. consumers spent about $31.72 per capita on
chicken in 1978. Taking the liberty of projecting the results from this
sample to these 1978 consumption figures, a crude estimate of the annual
loss from imperfect weight information on chicken can be obtained. Multiply-
ing the per capita expenditure figures by the approximate U.S. population
and then multiplying by the loss as a proportion of expenditure (LPE) figures
from column 6 of Table 1 gives a loss to consumers of about 2,550,000 dollars34
when LPE = .0003659 (full sample using Ec = -1.16). The loss is about
1,740,000 dollars when .0002503 is used as LPE (full sample usingEc. = -.78).
It should be noted that the procedure used to obtain these results
necessarily represents some departure from the model’s basic theory. Loss
from imperfect information is unique to each consumer based upon his/her
demand for the product, the information at each’s disposal, etc. The only
theoretically correct way to measure this loss is with the individual con-
sumer as was done in the model where individual demand curves led to obtaining
an EL for the individual which led to obtaining the MB of information for the
individual. Aggregation was
MBi’swere summedto obtain an
vision. In this application
done only in the final step where the individual
aggregate benefit figure from information pro-
it was necessary to begin with an aggregate
demand curve and assume its applicability to the individual consumer. The
loss figures from the individual packages were then summed to obtain the
total loss (L) figure. Essentially the basic difference is chat aggregation
is utilized at the beginning in the application rather than only at the end
as the model mandates.
The figures obtained for dollar losses from imperfect weight informa-
tion also can be interpreted as the value to consumers of improved weight
information. Figures of this sort have obvious significance in terms of
cost-benefit measurement for programs designed to improve label information
to consumers. For convenience one can take the simple average of the two
loss figures obtained to give a single loss formulation, (2,550,000+
1,740,000)/2 = 2,145,000. Figures of this sort could then be compared with
the costs incurred by sellers in providing new data and by consumers in
processing it to determine if there are net benefits or net costs generated35
by imposing the additional disclosure. In this particular example processing
costs to consumers are probably O since there would be no
label, only a more accurate representation of the product
assuming the loss figure $2,145,000 is somewhat valid, if
provide improved weight information of the type discussed
new information on the
weight. So, again
processors could
here at an annual
cost of less than 2,145,000, it can be concluded that it would be beneficial
to have them do so.
As another example it would be possible for all states to require a
drained weight labeling system as is done in some states. Taking the average
of the LPE’s obtained from the drained weight states with the influential
outlying cases dropped (rows 6 and 8 of Table 1) and multiplying by total
national expenditures gives an approximate annual loss of 890,000 dollars.
If such a system was imposed nationwide the reduction in loss would be
2,145,000 - 890,000 = 1,255,000 dollars. Therefore, if a drained weight
labeling system for chicken could be imposed nationwide at an annual cost
of less than 1,255,000 it would be socially beneficial to do so.
The results also indicate that in states which impose drained
labeling regulations overevaluation seems less likely to occur (note
3 from Table 1) and when the influential
siderably less in th(’sestates also. To
between the two subsamples, the absolute
each subsample. The mean value for
weight states and .0431 lbs. for the
significant differences between samp




cases are removed LPE becomes con-
test for significance of differences
values of the WS were summed for
was .0569 lbs. for the nondrained
drained weight states. A t test for
e deviation proportions produced a
of confidence
deviation be~ween ‘dDand WT was significantly less ,
drained weight labeling systt~m.
indicating that the mean
in states which had a36
11 sllollld also be noted that losses are greater when the larger elasticity
coeflicient is used. This result will be true in general since differentiating
the loss equation (equation 4.0) with respect to Ec gives
-w~p~c w
5.0 g-<= y— (WL- 1)
. D
the value of which will always be positive for W~+o. The minus sign at the
front of the expression is due to Ec always being a negative term. When
>W WS is negative making the first term in the expression positive.
‘L D’
In the second term WL/WD > 1 makes that term positive also. When WL K WD,
WS is positive making the first term negative. The second term is negative
also since WIIWD i 1, so the signs cancel out. ,
[v, some i’t~l i[y and Empirical Recommendations
The theoretical development in this paper indicates that in general
consumers can expect to incur some dollar loss in economic welfare in any
purchase situation in which they possess less than perfect information.
The more information a consumer processes the less will be the expected loss.
However, policy designed to simply put more and more product data before
consumers is not necessarily advisable. The costs to producers in generating
the data and to consumers in processing it must be considered. More attention
should be concentrated on the format of presentation in order to reduce these
costs and in turn encourage more provision and processing of data. k such
the following specific types of policy recommendations pertaining to food
labeling would seem to be in order. FDA should consider the effectiveness of
alternative presentation formats as a means of reducing processing costs.
Programs of nutritional education should be considered also as a means of
red[lcing procwsing costs. Also consumers should be made aware of losses37
‘they may incur f“romla(k of information. If they fail to recognize these
losses, they will not demand information. Finally, provision of still more
label data is not likely to be a good idea until consumers have learned how
to use the data currently at their disposal. Further provision at this time
could lead to information congestion and raise processing costs. No specific
recommendations can be made from the application of the model to the weight
data since no information is presently available on the costs involved in
providing more accurate weight data.
In terms of empirical analysis I would suggest that the following
questions need to be answered in the approximate order of their listing, As
will be noted work on some of these questions has already been done or is
c(lrrentl.y underway.
1. What foocls have l~utritional labels and what percentage of total
food expenditure is on foods which provide nutritional labeling? Surprisingly
this is not known but FDA :isinvestigating the question.
2. Have nutritional labeling requirements directly or indirectly made
foods more nutritious or expensive?
3. Is there a relationship between price and nutrient content of
brands of foods?
4. Do most consumers have a desire for the type of data supplied
through labeling requirements? The model presented previously indicates
they should, and existing studies seem to indicate they do.
5. What percentage of data on labels is understood, and would different
formats of presentation increase unde.rstanding? Existing studies indicate a
large lack of understanding and much confusion regarding some of the data
currently provided. There is no substantial evidence regarding the effective-
ness of ~ll(ernative prf~sentation formats.38
() . WI I;I[ {lr~~ th<’b(?ne[i~s and (:ostsassociated with speciEic types of
label disclosure pcograms? This paper developed a mechan.i.srn for analyzing
the benefits from obtaining information and made an initial estimation of
such benefits with the weight application,
7. Has the provision of potential information on food labels altered
consumer purchasing decisions? This is a key question and evidence to date
suggests consumers will alter their buying decisions based upon this type
of information. The Redbook survey (1976) reported 50% of women stopped -——-—
or cut back on purchases of a food because of high sugarp 39% due to high
cchol.e~rerol ,)nci 29% because of additives. However, no evidence has been
presented t~)+ow that provision of label data has significantly altered
demand for any specific food products,
8. What are the indirect costs and benefits which result from label
regulations, and how important are they? Many such effects have been postu-
lated, but discussion of them in this paper has been avoided in an attempt
to maintain some degree of conciseness.
v. Summary
The concern of this paper has been with product information in general
and nutritional information (labeling) on food products in particular. In
section I the studies cited indicated that most consumers do desire and would
be willing to pay for information of the type attainable from the standard
nutritional label which appears on many food products. These same studies,
however, indicated that often consumers were apparently not presently making
use of such data.
In section II a model was presented which developed a theoretical frame-
work for explaining and analyzing the information problem. It was shown that39
in the absence of perfect information about a product consumers incur some
expected dollar loss (EL) from expenditure misallocation. It was then demon-
strated that this EL leads to a demand for information by consumers who
would rationally be willing to pay for information an amount equal to the
reduction in EL that would be generated from it. Finally, it was shown that
both producers and consumers incur costs in providing data and processing
information respectively. These costs place limitations on the amount of data
voluntarily provided and the amount of information processed.
In section III the model was applied to a specific case of imperfect
information. Data indicated that the labeled weight for packages of chicken
could be either greater or less than the actual drained weight of the product.
It was shown that consumers would incur a loss in either case.40
VI. Apl)f ’11(1 ix
A. Computations to obtain equation 1.1.
Of interest is the consumer’s additional willingness to pay for WS.













is found by computing the average of areas WLFPWD
and
since Ws =W-w D L“ To find WLRSW
D
it is necessary to
WLRSWD, WLFPWD = P~fWS
solve for the change







‘iorAF’. Solving for P gives AP =
Ec Q
w p*
substituting in WS for AQ, WL for Q and P~;for P yields AP = ~~ .
L
Wsp$c
area W RSWD is then equal to (Pi<– –———
L 13ch!, ) ‘s“ The average of the areas
WLFPWD + WLRSW
D
p*ws + (pi, _ W:p*/EcWL) WS
is then .
2 2
. Factoring out P*
WLFPWD + WLRSWD w pk
Ind Ws yields ‘s
2 --:–-(2 - -F=). This gives the total
‘141
willingness to pay for Ws“ In order to find how much more the consumer would
be willing to pay ~labeled pound if




where HF is the additional willingness
in Figure V.
B. Steps to obtain equation 2.3.
he/she knew that the actual weight
expression through by WL giving
(2 -&-)
L
to pay per labeled pound as indicated
where
It is necessary to solve the elasticity equation for AQ = EcAP ~,
AP = P~’WL/WD- P’: (from expression 2.2)
P = P7~
Q=WL
Therefore, FJ = AQ = Ec(P’’’WWDWD - Pi;)WL/P$:.
Factoring out P* and canceling yields
2.3 (!l _ 1)5 FJ = AQ = ECWL w
D
c. SICps to (~t)t(lin (’qllation 4.0,
[nitially substitute equations 1.1 and 2.3 into the triangle area
formula:
p*w
L = 1/2 [+ ‘s ‘L (2 - ~~)] [EcWL (~ - 1)].
L L D
p$cw
Employ the associative law of multiplication and combine ~ with EcWL and
L
cancel the WL’S. This gives
p>kw
‘S ‘L ‘) Ec (2-~~) (~-l). L=(T
LD
Multiply the middle term through by Ec and cancel, which yields
3.0
p>?w w . ‘s L = (-+ (WA - 1) (2Ec - ~).
1) L42
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